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How non-binding minimum and maximum available prices affect prices in 
oligopoly market is still undetermined. A focal price effect exists in many field 
studies but so far no strong evidence is shown in laboratory experiments. In this 
thesis, the CH model, as an alternative of standard Nash equilibrium theory, is 
used to give a reasonable explanation why minimum and maximum available 
prices matter. Then a meta-analysis is taken to examine if those prices affect 
average prices and compare the effects under different experiment settings, like 
randomly matched or repeated games, Cournot or Bertrand competitions. The 
results show that available minimum and maximum prices have a significant 
positive effect on the average price controlling for the effect of the Nash 
Equilibrium price under almost all set-ups, which satisfies the prediction of CH 
model; round effects and market size matter in different way when market 
set-ups change. At the end, I run my own experiment of a Bertrand duopoly 
game with randomly re-matched subjects and the result is consistent with what I 
find in the meta-study.  
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Price ceilings and floors are common instruments of competition policy. They 
have been used at least since ancient Greek times and are still widely used in a 
variety of market systems. For as long as price controls have existed, their 
effects on welfare and distribution have been debated. But there is a commonly 
accepted conception that price controls can only affect prices and outputs when 
they are binding; non-binding price controls (that is, those ceilings above or 
floors below the competitive equilibrium price) prevent prices from getting 
higher than the ceiling or lower than the floor but do not harm competition. 
However, some economists have challenged the conclusion above that price 
ceilings cannot weaken competition as they may serve as collusive focal point 
for pricing, which is known as focal point hypothesis (Schelling, 1960; F. M. 
Scherer, 1970). The Folk Theorem (Tirole, 1988) asserts that outcomes of 
collusive equilibria are sustainable in infinitely repeated games with 
sufficiently high discount factor, while leading to the difficulty of coordination 
when firms attempt to collude. Price ceilings facilitate tacit collusion by 
providing a focal point on which firms coordinate and increase average market 
price. However, focal point hypothesis works only in repeated games with 
uncertain end and there is lack of generally accepted model to reveal the 
mechanism behind the hypothesis.  
Many field studies and a comparatively small number of laboratory 
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experiments have been carried out in this area. While most of field studies show 
that non-binding price ceilings facilitate collusion (Sheahan, 1961; Knittel and 
Stango, 2003; Eriksson, 2004; Mo, 2007), there is no such evidence in 
laboratory experiments. On the other hand, there are different arguments in 
relation to the effect of price floor. The argument that a price floor softens the 
competition is found in Robert Gagné’s working paper (2006) which analyzes 
the effects of price floor on price wars in the retail market for gasoline. Juan 
Esteban (2011) tested this hypothesis in the context of an actual regulation 
imposed in the retail gasoline market in the Canadian province of Quebec, 
which showed that the price floor policy led to more competition. Another 
interesting finding in Etienne Billette’s paper (2011) is that in the absence of 
collusion, introducing a price floor slightly below the observed transaction 
price has no impact on firms’ behaviour. However, the price floor makes 
collusive equilibra unsustainable. 
In this thesis, I use evidence from existing experiments of oligopoly 
markets to test the effect of non-binding price restrictions on prices in one-shot 
games, randomly re-matched games and repeated games, both aggregately and 
separately. The approach is to see whether the range of prices available to 
subjects affects their choice of prices. According to standard Nash equilibrium 
theory, the range of prices (above and below the Nash equilibrium price) should 
not affect the choice of price once the Nash equilibrium price is added as a 
control. In contrast, I show that the Cogitative Hierarchy model, an alternative 
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of standard Nash equilibrium theory, does imply that the minimum and 
maximum available price should affect the choice of prices, since the range of 
prices affects the prices set by naive decision makers and therefore the prices 
set by all higher level thinkers. In this paper, we assume that naïve decision 
makers will randomly pick up a number from within the price range, thus the 
estimate will be the average of minimum and maximum prices. Different basic 
assumptions will lead to different results.  
To distinguish CH model and focal point hypothesis, I test both one-shot 
game and repeated game. In one-shot games where the focal point hypothesis 
cannot offer a proper explanation, I find the result is consistent with CH's 
model predictions. In repeated games where the focal point hypothesis can 
provide a proper explanation, I only consider the monopoly price lower than 
the max price, thus the change of the max price shouldn't affect the average 
market price according to the focal point theory. I test this prediction using a 
meta-study of previous experiments and find that the average of maximum and 
minimum available prices significantly affects the average price set even 
though the maximum and minimum available prices are not a binding 
restriction in a one-shot game since they lie above and below the one-shot Nash 
equilibrium. The evidence is consistent with Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model 
but not Nash equilibrium theory. I also consider the evidence from repeated 
games, where the minimum and maximum available prices could affect the 
choice of price under existing theories of tacit collusion in repeated games as 
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well as in the CH model, to see whether it differs from that in which subjects do 
not have a constant match. To distinguish the implications of the theories, I also 
focus on a change in the maximum available price which is above the monopoly 
price, which should have no affect on the chosen prices in the standard theories 
of tacit collusion but will have an affect under the CH theory. Moreover, the 
tacit collusion theories have opposite predictions for prices below one-shot 
Nash, which I cannot eliminate in this meta-study. According to tacit collusion 
theories, the higher minimum price is, the lower the average price will be, since 
punishment is less severe. On the other hand, according to the CH model and 
the preliminary assumption, only the average of minimum and maximum 
prices matters, so it is difficult to measure the effect of price floors separately, 
which is consistent with previous empirical studies, where the effect of price 
floors is unclear. 
Oligopoly has been among the hottest topics in experimental economics 
for many years. There have been more than 154 experimental papers published 
since 1959 and most of the papers contain more than one experiment, which 
provide a huge database for meta-study in this area. In the paper How much 
collusion? A meta-analysis of oligopoly experiments, Engle (2007) aggregates 
those experiments and conducts a meta-study among them, trying to answer the 
question that how different experimental settings influence the strategic 
variable of the oligopolies, like price and quantity, but he overlooks the effect of 
minimum and maximum available prices and has not checked it in his study. I 
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look through the experiments included in his meta-study, select the ones with 
payoff tables or minimum and maximum available prices and synthesize them 
to test the relationship between the average price, minimum and maximum 
available prices and other experiment parameters with regression analysis. The 
different minimum and maximum available prices set in different experiments 
provide enough variances even though they are not what the experiments have 
set out to test. 
After that, I conduct my own experiment of a Bertrand duopoly game with 
randomly re-matched symmetric and differentiate settings. The 16 participants 
are graduate students with different majors and the experiment lasts about 2 
hours. Minimum and maximum available prices have been changed four times 
during the experiment to test how the changes affect average prices with 
eliminating round effect. The results of both meta-analysis and my own 
experiment confirm CH model’s implication.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes 
previous related papers. Section 3 presents the main idea of CH model, how to 
apply CH model to a simple Bertrand game and predict the average market price 
with it. Section 4 specifies the methodology. Section 5 presents the results. 
Section 6 introduces our own experimental design and analyzes our data. 
Section 7 addresses the conclusion. 
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2. Literature review 
We now provide more details about the related literatures concerning the 
traditional IO theory, empirical studies and experimental ones, and CH model.  
2.1 Nash equilibrium, focal point and folk theorem  
In traditional IO theory, there are two basic models in oligopoly market, 
Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. A version of the Nash 
equilibrium concept was first used by Antoine Augustin Cournot (1838) in his 
theory of oligopoly. In Cournot's theory, firms choose how much output to 
produce to maximize their own profit. However, the best output for one firm 
depends on the outputs of others. Cournot equilibrium occurs when each firm's 
output maximizes its profits given the output of the other firms, which is a 
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Bertrand (1883), on the other hand, describes 
another model which simulates oligopoly market as firms competing in price. 
Bertrand equilibrium occurs when each firm's output maximizes its profits 
given the price of the other firms. Non-cooperative outcome is the only Nash 
equilibrium of both models. Thus, we can expect that Nash equilibrium price 
will be a good approximation of the average price in an oligopoly market both 
in Cournot competition setting and Bertrand one. Consequently, average price 
will not be influenced by changing price range from which they can choose 
from as far as Nash price is within the range. 
We consider one-shot game above, but when it comes to repeated games, 
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things will be different. The early statement is from Friedman (1971) in his 
paper that any average payoff vector that is better for all players than a 
Nash-equilibrium payoff vector of the constituent game can be sustained as 
the outcome of a perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated games if the 
players are sufficiently patient. Following this statement, Tirole (1988) further 
asserts and proofs that feasible outcomes of collusive equilibria are sustainable 
in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently high discount factor, which is so 
called “folk theorem” in game theory. Under this situation, more than one 
feasible choice will cause trouble for people to collude at one certain point 
without communication. The concept of focal point, which is also called 
Shelling point, suggests a possible solution to this problem. A focal point is a 
solution that people will tend to use in the absence of communication, because 
it seems natural, special or relevant to them. The concept was first introduced 
by Thomas Schelling (1960) in his book The Strategy of Conflict. He 
describes: “focal point[s] for each person’s expectation of what the other 
expects him to expect to be expected to do.” Back to the issue that if the 
change of minimum and maximum prices will influence average price in 
repeated games, it seems that the available maximum price, which is higher 
than the Nash equilibrium price, acts as a focal point for collusion. In this way, 
when we increase the maximum price, the average price will also rise up 




2.2 Empirical study, laboratory experiments and meta-analysis 
There are plenty of field evidences illustrating focal point effect in various 
markets. Sheahan (1961) analyzes the effect of price controls in postwar 
France; Knittel and Stango (2003) study the interest rates of credit cards in the 
1980s, U.S.; Eriksson (2004) investigates the 1999 deregulation of dental 
services market in Sweden; Ma (2007) studies price ceilings in Taiwan’s flour 
market. On the contrary, laboratory experiments haven’t shown sufficient 
evidence to support the focal point hypothesis. Issac and Plott (1981) and 
Smith and Williams(1981) analyze double auction markets with price controls 
and find that price ceilings lower prices; Coursey and Smith(1983) analyze 
price ceilings in posted-offer markets and find convergence to the competitive 
equilibrium; Engelmann and Normann (2005) report an experiment also in 
posted-offer market with symmetric sellers and larger incentive to collude 
whose result is against focal price hypothesis; Finally, Engelmann and 
Muller(2008) conduct an experiment with asymmetric sellers, unique Nash 
equilibrium and large incentive to collude at price ceiling but fail to find focal 
price effect again.  
That laboratory experiments fail to find a focal point effect might be due 
to some inappropriate or biased settings and samples. The good aspect of 
laboratory markets is that it is easy to control relevant parameters with 
different experimental treatments. However, it is hard to adjust all the 
parameters which have significant effects on the market price in limited 
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number of experiments. Fortunately, there are a large number of experimental 
papers in oligopoly market. 154 papers have been published and most of them 
report on more than one experiment, which add up to more than 500 
experiments with different parameter set-ups, where a meta-study can be 
conducted to make comparison among them. There are some meta-studies 
concentrating on how experimental treatments affect the strategic variable of 
the oligopolies. Huck et al. (2004) investigate how the number of sellers in 
Cournot games matters by calculating the index NN, which expresses average 
quantity from the experiment as a fraction of the respective Nash expectation. 
Engel (2007) conducts a more integrated meta-analysis on how much 
collusion under different features of the experimental setting and how the 
features interact with each other using the indices CW and CN, which tell 
percentage collusion compared with Walrasian level and Nash equilibrium 
each. In this thesis, we make use of the database of Engel’s paper, select 
proper experiments and find out the min, max and Nash prices in each 
experiment. Then a meta-study is undertaken to demonstrate the influence of 
price controls on the average price by controlling for min and max prices and 
other parameters, as well as Nash equilibrium price. A large number of 
experiments assure there are sufficient variances.  
2.3 Cognitive Hierarchy model 
Although focal price hypothesis is wide spread and lots of field study and 
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laboratory experiments want to find the evidence of it, there is a lack of a 
generally accepted model to reveal the mechanism behind it. Bardsley et al. 
(2008) report experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players 
use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games, namely, 
cognitive hierarchy (CH) theory (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004) and team 
reasoning theory (Sugden, 1993; Bacharach, 1999). Each of them is strongly 
supported by one experiment. The CH theory is good at explaining why 
equilibrium theory predicts poorly in many games, including coordination 
games mentioned in Bardsley’s paper, and also dominance-solvable games, 
market entry games and so on. In CH theory, each player assumes that his 
strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively defined 
strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, 
assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k-1. The 
model can be applied to explain the average price in oligopoly market which 
deviates from equilibrium in one-shot game with one pure Nash. I will 
elaborate on this model more in the next section. 
3. CH Model’s implication in a Bertrand duopoly game 
Most theories of behavior assume that players play strategically, which means 
they can response rationally given their belief about what others might play. If 
it is also assumed that players’ beliefs about each other are consistent with 
their behaviors, then mutual rationality and mutual consistency taken together 
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define equilibrium. However, in the real world, equilibrium sometimes cannot 
predict outcomes accurately because players make wrong beliefs about what 
others do. CH model, as an alternative of equilibrium theory, models decision 
rules that follows a step-by-step reasoning procedure of strategic thinking. 
Previously, this theory has been formalized as level-k theory (Stahl and Wilson, 
1995). CH theory (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004) is a simplified form. 
The CH model in Camerer et. Al. (2004) consists of iterative decision 
rules for players doing k steps of thinking. The frequency distribution f(k) is 
assumed to follow Poisson distribution for step k players. The “step 0” 
thinkers are defined as the ones who do not assume anything about their 
competitors and simply make decision according to some probability 
distribution (we assume uniform for simplicity). “Step k” thinkers assume that 
their opponents are distributed, according to a normalized Poisson distribution, 
from step 0 to step k-1, which means they accurately predict the relative 
frequencies of players doing fewer steps of thinking, but do not take the 
possibility into consideration that some players may have the same thinking 
level with them or even think more than they do.  
Here I apply CH model to a simple linear demand Bertrand Duopoly 
game to show how the average price is influenced by minimum and maximum 
available prices, a key point which is overlooked in Nash equilibrium theory 
with its perfect rationality assumption. Suppose in a Bertrand game with 2 
differentiated products and 2 symmetric firms, 
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Firms’ profit functions are: 
                               (1) 
                               (2)                       
Thus, the equilibrium prices according to Nash equilibrium theory in a 
one-shot game are: 
                                            (3)                      
If 0-step thinker randomly chooses among all prices between the 
minimum and maximum available prices, then their average price they will set 
is . 1-step thinkers make decision based on the belief 
that all the others are 0-step players, so they respond by choosing the price 
which maximizes their profit, so 
                                             (4)                  
2-step players think the other players are a combination of 0-step players 
and 1-step players. Denote a k-step player’s belief about the proportion of 
h-step players by  (  because players ignore 
the possibility that some players may use higher step of thinking or at the same 
thinking level as they are). , where f(h) is the 
real frequency of h-step player. Thus 2-step players choose price: 
   (5)                    
And as shown,  can be expressed by . With iteration,  can 
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always be expressed by the frequencies of 1 to k-1 step players and . Thus, 
the average market price can also be expressed by the frequencies of 1 to k-1 
step players and . As a result, min and max prices have effect on average 
price by influencing the 0-step players’ price choice, which makes the average 
price differ from the prediction of the standard Nash equilibrium. For a market 
with a certain average thinking level, higher min and max prices lead to higher 
average price.  
The theoretical result from the CH model depends on the assumption on 
how P0 is defined. In previous discussions, we specified P0 as the average of 
minimum and maximum prices. If the assumption on P0 is changed, the result 
will change accordingly. However, we can demonstrate later in this paper, that 
the regression outcome is consistent with the preliminary assumption on P0. 
Besides the one-shot game condition discussed above, the iteration 
mechanism also affects randomly re-matched games and repeated games. In 
randomly re-matched games, players are influenced by previous results. Some 
say they choose the strategy which has had good result, while others argue that 
they response based on a weighted average of what others have done in the 
past. Experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model (Camerer and Ho, 1999) is 
a more general one combining the two cases above. No matter which model to 
choose, the iteration thinking process will influence the remaining rounds’ 
price level by dynamic learning. It can be expected that after several rounds, 
the price level might converge to the Nash equilibrium. In repeated games, 
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besides the learning effect, players also take the future effect of current actions 
into consideration and they can teach other less strategic players by choosing 
current behavior. Thus, similarly, the iteration thinking process also influences 
the remaining repeated rounds by dynamic teaching and learning. This thesis 
studies the difference between re-matched games and repeated ones, but most 
importantly is to show how minimum and maximum available prices influence 
the average price, especially in randomly re-matched games.  
4. Methodology of meta-analysis 
As is shown in the above section, minimum and maximum available prices 
affect the average market price by affecting what level-0 thinkers do and by 
followed iteration process, which is implicated by CH model instead of Nash 
equilibrium theory. I want to test in a meta-study if it is true that minimum and 
maximum available prices matter and affect the average price in the predicted 
direction, to be specific, if higher max and min prices lead to higher average 
price in games with different settings, controlling for the Nash equilibrium 
price. I follow the standard procedure of meta-analysis. I look through 
experimental literature in oligopoly market (they are all from the database of 
Engle’s paper); then I select relevant experiments according to some criteria; 
after that I take the average price as the dependent variable and run the OLS 
regression.  
Selecting relevant experiments is one of the most important steps of 
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meta-analysis. Engle’s paper includes 23 treatment variables including 
different set-ups from several categories, namely, product characteristics, 
market characteristics, information environment and so on. Some experiments 
have a related topic and are within the database, but are not covered in my 
meta-study. I make the selection according to the following features: (1) no 
communication is allowed; (2) firms make their decisions simultaneously; (3) 
feedback after each round only includes aggregate information about the 
behavior of other firms; (4) there is complete information about one’s own 
payoff function; (5) symmetric firms; (6) no discounting (although it is 
important, it is seldom defined in previous experiments and most of the 
experiments assume it equals to one.); (7) passive buyers; (8) payoff table or 
continuous price range is provided; (9) Nash equilibrium price and monopoly 
price are both within the available price range (nonbinding). I also exclude the 
papers where only graphs are given without exact numbers to calculate the 
means and the ones only giving regressions without summary statistics where 
data is impossible to be re-constructed.  
81 relevant experiments are picked up. These experiments differ in 
several ways: (1) repeated design or randomly re-matched one; (2) Cournot 
competition or Bertrand one; (3) market size; (4) round number (duration). I 
will demonstrate the difference between them in detail.  
I determine the minimum and maximum available prices and Nash prices 
from each selected experiment. For experiments with Cournot competition, I 
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follow the models’ construction and calculate respective prices from quantities. 
23 of the 81 experiments included in this study make use of a stranger design, 
which means players are randomly re-matched in each round. This is not 
exactly the same as one-shot interaction because players gain knowledge and 
experiences from previous rounds, but it is a good approximation of one-shot 
game. In the rest of the 58 experiments, however, players’ interaction is 
repeated. Folk theorem tells us that repeated game leads to multiple Nash 
equilibria if discount rate is sufficiently high and the end is uncertain. But as I 
choose experiments with maximum available price higher than monopoly 
price, I eliminate the focal point effect and focus on how mechanism 
suggested by CH model works. To simplify the problem, one-shot game Nash 
equilibrium is taken as the equilibrium for randomly re-matched games and 
repeated games approximately. I will compare the difference between the two 
designs. The possible difference between Cournot and Bertrand competitions 
will also be covered. 
The effect of the respective treatment on the strategic variables of 
oligopolies (price or quantity) is presented in all the papers. Some provide 
average price each round; others only reveal the aggregate result. It can be 
expected that there is a big change from the very first round through the 
middle of the game to the end. Specifically, a dynamic teaching and learning 
process is happening in the middle and players tend to deviate from collusion 
towards the end, especially for repeated-partner settings. Duration matters and 
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it varies between experiments. I’ll report aggregate average price controlling 
for round-number. Besides that, comparison between first half round average 
prices and second half average prices in repeated games will be made. 
5. Meta-analysis Results 
Table 1 below lists the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the 
regressions of the 81 experiments included in the Meta Analysis. Market size 
reflects the number of players in the same market. “Sellers” and “Stranger” are 
two dummy variables. Sellers=1 represents Cournot competition while 
Sellers=0 stands for Bertrand competition. Stranger=1 means only samples 
with randomly re-matched settings will be selected out in this regression. 
Similarly, Stranger=0 means only repeated games are chosen in that regression. 
Pmax and Pmin are the corresponding maximum and minimum available 












Market size 2.93 1.75 2.00 2.00 4.00 
Sellers 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Stranger 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Pmax 92.82 109.42 10.00 92.00 120.00 
Pmin 13.75 40.63 0.00 0.00 11.46 
Pn 44.14 65.63 4.00 20.80 77.76 







There are 12 specifications. Put all the regression outcomes into one table 
(coefficient and standard error for each variable): 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
C 6.05  7.00  5.05  5.75  5.51  1.46  3.70  5.38  0.70  5.91  0.27  7.32  
3.51  4.58  4.87  3.62  4.92  8.57  8.52  1.29  1.13  4.15  0.69  5.15  
PMAX_MIN
AVG 
0.20  0.47  0.15    0.50  0.29  0.11  0.23          
0.07  0.07  0.10    0.07  0.11  0.11  0.05          
PMAX       0.10                  
      0.03                  
PMIN       0.06                  
      0.11                  
PN 0.70  0.57  0.75  0.72  0.57  0.74  0.90  0.80          
0.07  0.07  0.11  0.10  0.07  0.18  0.17  0.06          
ROUNDS -0.03  0.07  -0.01  -0.04  0.06        0.01  0.05  0.01  0.03  
0.08  0.17  0.10  0.08  0.17        0.03  0.17  0.01  0.17  
MARKETSIZE -0.62  -3.33  -0.47  -0.63  -3.27  -0.32  0.06  -1.18  -0.06  -2.76  0.17  -2.97  
0.89  1.58  1.09  0.90  1.59  3.03  3.01  0.55  0.30  1.62  0.17  1.71  
SELLERS         2.02              -1.23  
        2.33              2.57  
PMAX_MIN
AVG*PN 
              -0.00
0482 
        
              0.000
188  
        
PADJUST                 0.35  0.40  -0.45  0.39  




  I will explain the results as follows: 
5.1 Consider whole duration for each experiment  
From the implication of the CH model as mentioned in section 3, we know 
that the average of min and max prices can affect the average market price. 
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Thus, in the regression, dependent variable is the aggregate average price of 
all the rounds; Independent variables include the average of min and max 
prices, Nash price, experiment rounds (duration) and market size, which is 
defined as the number of subjects per market.  
5.1.1 Overall  
The overall result is reported as the first specification. T-statistics for the 
average of min and max prices and Nash price are significant and their signs 
are positive, which is consistent with our expectation. 
5.1.2 Randomly re-matched games & repeated games  
Specifications 2 and 3 illustrate randomly re-matched games and repeated 
games separately. When players are randomly matched, the average price is 
highly and positively dependent on the average of max and min prices, Nash 
price, which is consistent with CH model’s implication and is negatively and 
significantly related with market size, which is consistent with Huck’s finding 
(2004). In contrast, when players are repeatedly playing with unchanged 
partners, the average price can only be significantly explained by Nash price. 
When max and min prices are changed, CH model interprets what happens in 
one-shot game clearly. Each round of randomly re-matched games can be 
approximately looked at as a one-shot game. Thus, the result of randomly 
re-matched games is pretty the same with the estimation of CH model. 
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However, on the repeated-game side, CH model doesn’t provide an obvious 
anticipation, taking the dynamic teaching and learning process into 
consideration, while Nash price seems to explain the average price better in 
this case.   
The influence of min and max prices are then measured individually to 
see if the preliminary assumption that equals to min or max price is reasonable. 
Specification 4 shows that Pmax is significant but Pmin is insignificant. It 
illustrates that the assumptions that equal to the average of minimum and 
maximum and that the assumption that it is simply equal to the maximum 
price are both consistent with the regression outcome. The impact of minimum 
price, however, is still vague. 
5.1.3 Cournot competition & Bertrand competition 
I add another dummy variable “sellers” as independent variable to control for 
the influence of different competition settings in specification 5. And here only 
randomly re-matched games are considered. All the other coefficients and 
significant levels are quite similar to specification 2 and the insignificant 
t-value of sellers shows that different competition types do not affect the 
average price heavily.  
5.2 Separate the duration of each experiment into two parts 
In this part, I look further into the dynamic changing process of repeated 
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games. Thus, in the following regressions, only repeated-game design is 
considered. I take average prices of the first half and second half rounds and 
do not control duration in the regression. I do not take the average prices of the 
first n rounds and last n rounds because most papers don’t provide prices for 
each round but most of them provide the first and second half average prices. 
Duration of each experiment is quite different and it makes more sense to 
compare first and last halves instead of first and last n rounds among those 
experiments. Intuitively speaking, the first half rounds of repeated games 
should be more similar to one-shot games when teaching and learning haven’t 
equipped participants with enough experience, where min and max prices 
might still play a role in their decision making according to CH model. On the 
contrary, in the second half, firms have learned a lot and have updated their 
beliefs about their partners, and people will no longer pay attention to the min 
and max price. Here, P1 represents the average price of the first half and P2 
represents the average price of the second half. 
Comparing specifications 6 and 7, we can find the results quite similar to 
our expectation. In the first half rounds, the average price positively and 
significantly relies on the average min and max prices and Nash price, but in 
the second half, t-value of the average min and max prices is no longer 
significant. Moreover, the coefficient of pmax_minavg decreases while the 
coefficient of pn increases from specification 6 to 7.  
In order to analyse whether the learning process is important, the data is 
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separated into each round and an interaction term between PMAX-MINAVG 
and PN is incorporated. The result is shown in specification 8. 
5.3 Normalize the average market price and the average min and max 
prices 
I also try to normalize all the price data, including the average market price 
and the average of min and max prices, so that one cannot claim that the 
different unit and range of prices in different experiments (like 1 cent or 1 
dollar) affect the regression result. . 
 So when price is Nash, the adjusted one will be 
equal to 0 and when price is monopoly, the adjusted one will be equal to 1. 
After the normalization, I run the previous regressions again by taking 
place of Pavg and Pmax_minavg with the adjusted ones.  
Specification 9 shows the overall regression result including the 
randomly re-matched games and the repeated games. We can see Padjust still 
have significant effect on Pavgadjust. 
Specification 10 is the result when we only consider randomly 
re-matched games. The normalized average of min and max prices still 
significantly affects the normalized average price, which is consistent with CH 
model’s prediction. 
Specification 11 illustrates the situation under the repeated-game setting. 
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Padjust has a significantly negative effect on Pavgadjust, which is opposite 
with CH model’s prediction. This might be due to the opposite prediction from 
tacit collusion theory.  
The regression of specification 12 was added into the variable sellers and 
it seems that Cournot or Bertrand competition doesn’t affect the result 
significantly. 
In conclusion, the results after normalization are quite similar to the ones 
before normalization, which strengthens our argument about CH model’s 
prediction.  
6. My experiment  
I conduct an experiment to test the effect of minimum and maximum available 
prices on the average market price. I generate a payoff table based on the 
functions from a linear demand model (Lu, Wright, 2009) with 2 symmetric 
but differentiate firms, Bertrand competition and specifying α=42, β=1, γ=8/11 
and c=0. There is only one Bertrand-Nash price, which equals to 9. The 
minimum and maximum available prices is changed four times (1-25, 7-25, 
1-22, 7-22) during the experiments but it is made sure that the Nash 
equilibrium price and monopoly price are always within the price range (the 
nonbinding case). The experiment includes 20 rounds in total. There are 16 
participants in total. Players are randomly re-matched in each round. Each two 
players are matched to operate in one market, so there are 8 separate markets. 
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To see the detailed instructions and the payoff table, please refer to appendices 
2 and 3. To see the experiment raw result, please refer to the appendix 4. 
I calculate the average prices of all 16 players for each round and put 
them with each run’s min/max prices, Nash equilibrium price into table 13. 
I then draw a figure (figure 1), which illustrates the trend of average price 
changing during the 20 rounds. From the figure below, we can see that the 
overall trend of average price is decreasing. But there are small fluctuations. 
Changes in minimum and maximum available prices affect the average price 
while round effect also matters in this process. To see only the effect of 
minimum and maximum available prices changes, I need to control for the 
effect of duration. 
 
round pmin pmax Pn pavg 
1 1 25 9 13 
2 1 25 9 13.5625 
3 1 25 9 12.1875 
4 1 25 9 10.3125 
5 1 25 9 10.375 
6 1 22 9 11.3125 
7 1 22 9 11.125 
8 1 22 9 10.5 
9 1 22 9 10.625 
10 1 22 9 8.875 
11 7 25 9 11.875 
12 7 25 9 11.6875 
13 7 25 9 10.9375 
14 7 25 9 10.6875 
15 7 25 9 10.0625 
16 7 22 9 11.375 
17 7 22 9 10.3125 
18 7 22 9 9.4375 
19 7 22 9 9.0625 







I have simply regressed PAVG on PMAX-MINAVG and ROUND. The 
result shows that PAVG is positively dependent on the average of minimum 
and maximum prices and is negatively correlated with ROUND, which is 
consistent with our meta-analysis result. 
 
Dependent Variable: PAVG   
Sample: 1 20    
Included observations: 20   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     (PMAX+PMIN)/2 0.354886 0.142037 2.498549 0.0230 
ROUND -0.178693 0.041310 -4.325697 0.0005 
C 7.893466 1.747692 4.516508 0.0003 
     




I have applied the Cognitive Hierarchy model into a one-shot Bertrand 
duopoly game and proved that the nonbinding available minimum and 
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maximum prices can affect the average market price by influencing 0-level 
thinkers’ decision and the followed iteration process of higher level thinkers. 
Specifically, the higher the average of minimum and maximum prices is, the 
higher the average market price could be. 
Then I take a meta-study to aggregate and compare the results of previous 
laboratory experiments. I make use of an OLS regression to see the 
relationship between the average market price, as the dependant variable and 
the average of minimum and maximum prices, Nash equilibrium price, market 
size as well as round-number, as independent variables. I also consider the 
possible difference between different set-ups, namely, randomly re-matched 
design versus repeated one, Cournot competition versus Bertrand one. Apart 
from that, providing that experiments’ duration plays an inevitably important 
role, especially in repeated games, I separate the whole duration into the first 
half and the second half and analysis how average prices of the first and 
second halves change respond to the other explanatory variables mentioned 
above. The meta-study’s results are similar to the prediction of the CH model. 
In randomly re-matched games, a good approximation of one-shot games, the 
average of minimum and maximum prices affects the average market price 
positively and significantly even controlling for the Nash equilibrium price, 
which is consistent with CH model’s implication. Choosing Cournot or 
Bertrand competition, however, doesn’t quite change the pattern. In repeated 
games, on the other hand, due to the more complicated dynamic learning and 
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teaching process, CH model doesn’t have a clear prediction, perhaps why the 
regression result does not find any significant effect of the minimum and 
maximum prices. But when I separate the duration into two parts, it is easily 
found that the influence of the average of minimum and maximum prices 
fades out from the first half to the second one. To strength our argument, I 
normalize all the price data, adjusting them for monopoly price and Nash 
equilibrium price. The results after normalization are similar to what we have 
before normalization. 
In the end, I run my own experiment of a Bertrand duopoly game with 
randomly re-matched symmetric and differentiate firms. After eliminating the 
round effect, I focus on seeking the affect of the average of minimum and 
maximum prices on the average market price and find out the result consistent 
with what I find in the meta-study and also CH model’s prediction.  
There are some further studies worth doing. For example, if the Nash 
equilibrium price is at the edge of available minimum and maximum prices, or 
even beyond the available price range instead of the nonbinding condition, 
will the change of price range influence the average market price and if it will, 
in what way. And we can also pay attention to how to make use of CH model 
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Appendix2. Original regression outcomes from Eviews 
Dependent Variable: PAVG   
Sample: 1 81    
Included observations: 81   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PMAX_MINAVG 0.200775 0.069207 2.901066 0.0049 
PN 0.699350 0.074545 9.381606 0.0000 
ROUNDS -0.032275 0.082744 -0.390054 0.6976 
MARKETSIZE -0.615217 0.890086 -0.691189 0.4916 
C 6.048745 3.507243 1.724644 0.0887 
     
      
Table 1 
 
Dependent Variable: PAVG   
Sample: 1 81 IF STRANGER=1   
Included observations: 23   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PMAX_MINAVG 0.466666 0.066501 7.017447 0.0000 
PN 0.568775 0.066249 8.585349 0.0000 
ROUNDS 0.066583 0.171141 0.389052 0.7018 
MARKETSIZE -3.332589 1.579795 -2.109507 0.0492 
C 7.001284 4.578419 1.529193 0.1436 
     
      
Table 2 
 
Dependent Variable: PAVG   
Sample: 1 81 IF STRANGER=0   
Included observations: 58   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PMAX_MINAVG 0.152516 0.097416 1.565605 0.1234 
PN 0.752226 0.106171 7.085043 0.0000 
ROUNDS -0.007448 0.104435 -0.071320 0.9434 
MARKETSIZE -0.470109 1.092488 -0.430310 0.6687 
C 5.054990 4.873744 1.037188 0.3044 
     
      




Dependent Variable: PAVG 
Sample: 1 81    
Included observations: 81   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PMAX 0.099781 0.034841 2.863891 0.0054 
PMIN 0.062539 0.108558 0.576088 0.5663 
PN 0.721956 0.096916 7.449291 0.0000 
ROUNDS -0.035139 0.083582 -0.420413 0.6754 
MARKETSIZE -0.634643 0.896746 -0.707718 0.4813 
C 5.752891 3.617787 1.590168 0.1160 
     
      
Table 4 
 
Dependent Variable: PAVG   
Sample: 1 81 IF STRANGER=1   
Included observations: 23   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PMAX_MINAVG 0.495384 0.074682 6.633215 0.0000 
PN 0.569704 0.066716 8.539304 0.0000 
ROUNDS 0.055884 0.172763 0.323470 0.7503 
MARKETSIZE -3.267686 1.592459 -2.051975 0.0559 
SELLERS 2.022384 2.329094 0.868313 0.3973 
C 5.509930 4.919585 1.119999 0.2783 
     
      
Table 5 
 
Dependent Variable: P1   
Sample: 1 51 IF STRANGER=0   
Included observations: 36   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PMAX_MINAVG 0.294508 0.105947 2.779754 0.0090 
PN 0.737593 0.175774 4.196259 0.0002 
MARKETSIZE -0.320196 3.025170 -0.105844 0.9164 
C 1.457997 8.571142 0.170105 0.8660 
     





Dependent Variable: P2   
Sample: 1 51 IF STRANGER=0   
Included observations: 36   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PMAX_MINAVG 0.105903 0.105361 1.005144 0.3224 
PN 0.895747 0.174801 5.124379 0.0000 
MARKETSIZE 0.058006 3.008427 0.019281 0.9847 
C 3.695270 8.523705 0.433529 0.6675 
     
      
Table 7 
 
Dependent Variable: PAVG   
Sample: 1 241   
Included observations: 241   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PMAX_MINAVG 0.227948 0.045882 4.968097 0.0000 
PN 0.796303 0.058213 13.67910 0.0000 
PMAX_MINAVG*PN -0.000482 0.000188 -2.559622 0.0111 
MARKETSIZE -1.177784 0.551119 -2.137077 0.0336 
C 5.377641 1.290615 4.166727 0.0000 
     
      
Table 8 
 
Dependent Variable: PAVGADJUST  
Sample: 1 81    
Included observations: 791   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PADJUST 0.347873 0.025426 13.68183 0.0000 
ROUNDS 0.011908 0.026909 0.442527 0.6594 
MARKETSIZE -0.056926 0.295791 -0.192452 0.8479 
C 0.698198 1.125551 0.620317 0.5369 
     
      
Table 9 
 
                                                             
1 There are two observations with monopoly price at the edge of the maximum prices, so the 
normalized prices do not exist, which explains why there are two missing observations. 
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Dependent Variable: PAVGADJUST  
Sample: 1 81 IF STRANGER=1   
Included observations: 23   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PADJUST 0.395155 0.038649 10.22426 0.0000 
ROUNDS 0.051430 0.166780 0.308370 0.7612 
MARKETSIZE -2.763407 1.615168 -1.710910 0.1034 
C 5.913260 4.146715 1.426011 0.1701 
     
      
Table 10 
 
Dependent Variable: PAVGADJUST  
Sample: 1 81 IF STRANGER=0   
Included observations: 56   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PADJUST -0.445571 0.078630 -5.666686 0.0000 
ROUNDS 0.012195 0.014954 0.815478 0.4185 
MARKETSIZE 0.167582 0.168201 0.996317 0.3237 
C 0.266577 0.692725 0.384823 0.7019 
     
      
Table 11 
 
Dependent Variable: PAVGADJUST  
Sample: 1 81 IF STRANGER=1   
Included observations: 23   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PADJUST 0.389723 0.041040 9.496109 0.0000 
ROUNDS 0.034013 0.174069 0.195399 0.8473 
MARKETSIZE -2.972546 1.705256 -1.743167 0.0984 
SELLERS -1.234396 2.566856 -0.480898 0.6364 
C 7.320428 5.146115 1.422515 0.1720 
     







Appendix3. Instruction for Participants 
This is an experiment on market decision-making. Take the time to read 
carefully the instructions. A good understanding of the instructions and well 
thought out decisions during the experiment can earn you a considerable 
amount of money. In this experiment, you will be one of two sellers in a 
market. You will have to decide at which price you are going to sell a certain 
commodity. There will be 20 rounds of trade. Each round will take 1 minute. 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will get a registration number 
and a pile of coupons with the number on it. Please do not let other players 
know which number you hold. You need to write down the price you choose 
in each round on your coupons. You will be provided with a payoff table, from 
which you can tell how much you will get if you yourself and the other player 
set certain prices. The other player has the same payoff table. 
You will be re-matched with one of any other students in each round, 
meaning your partner will change from round to round randomly. In each 
round you will be informed of the minimum and maximum available prices 
you can choose from. In the first 5 rounds, you can choose prices from 1 to 25; 
in the second 5 rounds, you can choose from 1 to 22; in the third 5 rounds, you 
can choose from 7 to 25; in the last 5 rounds, you can choose from 7 to 22. 
After each round, the monitor will take your coupons and put them in a box. 
Then monitor will randomly choose two coupons and write down the players’ 
numbers and respective prices on the board so that you can find out your profit 
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from the payoff table. The same procedure will be carried out for all the 16 
coupons.  
Your payment will depend on the whole payoffs you get in all the rounds. 
After the experiment, your payment will be computed and you will be paid 
immediately in cash. Every 1000 payoff could be changed to 1SGD. Please 
keep in mind that communication is not allowed in the experiment. After you 
have read the instructions, you will have the opportunity to ask questions. 
Before we start with the actual experiment, we will ask you a few questions in 
order to review these instructions and ensure everybody has fully understood 



























Appendix4. Payoff Table 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1 23.7 25.3 26.8 28.4 29.9 31.5 33 34.5 36.1 37.6 39.2 40.7 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
2 43.2 46.3 49.4 52.5 55.6 58.7 61.8 64.8 67.9 71 74.1 77.2 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
3 58.5 63.1 67.7 72.4 77 81.6 86.3 90.9 95.5 100.2 104.8 109.4 114.1 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
4 69.5 75.6 81.8 88 94.2 100.4 106.5 112.7 118.9 125.1 131.2 137.4 143.6 149.8 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 
5 76.2 83.9 91.7 99.4 107.1 114.8 122.5 130.3 138 145.7 153.4 161.1 168.9 176.6 184.3 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
6 78.7 88 97.3 106.5 115.8 125.1 134.3 143.6 152.8 162.1 171.4 180.6 189.9 199.2 208.4 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 
7 77 87.8 98.6 109.4 120.2 131 141.8 152.6 163.5 174.3 185.1 195.9 206.7 217.5 228.3 239.1 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 
8 71 83.4 95.7 108.1 120.4 132.8 145.1 157.5 169.8 182.2 194.5 206.9 219.2 231.6 243.9 256.3 268.6 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
9 60.8 74.7 88.6 102.5 116.4 130.3 144.2 158.1 171.9 185.8 199.7 213.6 227.5 241.4 255.3 269.2 283.1 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 
10 46.3 61.8 77.2 92.6 108.1 123.5 138.9 154.4 169.8 185.3 200.7 216.1 231.6 247 262.5 277.9 293.3 308.8 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
11 27.6 44.6 61.6 78.5 95.5 112.5 129.5 146.5 163.5 180.4 197.4 214.4 231.4 248.4 265.4 282.3 299.3 316.3 333.3 341 341 341 341 341 341 
12 0 23.2 41.7 60.2 78.7 97.3 115.8 134.3 152.8 171.4 189.9 208.4 226.9 245.5 264 282.5 301.1 319.6 338.1 356.6 360 360 360 360 360 
13 0 0 17.6 37.6 57.7 77.8 97.8 117.9 138 158.1 178.1 198.2 218.3 238.3 258.4 278.5 298.5 318.6 338.7 358.8 377 377 377 377 377 
14 0 0 0 10.8 32.4 54 75.6 97.3 118.9 140.5 162.1 183.7 205.3 226.9 248.6 270.2 291.8 313.4 335 356.6 378.2 392 392 392 392 
15 0 0 0 0 2.9 26.1 49.2 72.4 95.5 118.7 141.8 165 188.2 211.3 234.5 257.6 280.8 303.9 327.1 350.3 373.4 396.6 405 405 405 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.5 43.2 67.9 92.6 117.3 142 166.7 191.4 216.1 240.8 265.5 290.2 314.9 339.6 364.4 389.1 413.8 416 416 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.8 36.1 62.3 88.6 114.8 141.1 167.3 193.6 219.8 246.1 272.3 298.5 324.8 351 377.3 403.5 425 425 
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27.8 55.6 83.4 111.2 138.9 166.7 194.5 222.3 250.1 277.9 305.7 333.5 361.3 389.1 429.8 432 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.3 47.7 77 106.3 135.7 165 194.3 223.7 253 282.3 311.7 341 370.3 416.8 444.6 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.7 38.6 69.5 100.4 131.2 162.1 193 223.9 254.7 285.6 316.5 347.4 399.7 429 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28.4 60.8 93.2 125.6 158.1 190.5 222.9 255.3 287.7 320.2 378.2 409.1 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 50.9 84.9 118.9 152.8 186.8 220.8 254.7 288.7 352.6 385 
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.4 39.9 75.5 111 146.5 182 217.5 253 322.7 356.6 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27.8 64.8 101.9 138.9 176 213.1 252.5 324 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14.5 53.1 91.7 130.3 168.9 250.1 251.2 
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Appendix5. Experiment result 
 
1-25 7-25 1-22 7-22 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 R17 R18 R19 R20 
13 11 15 10 25 18 10 11 19 8 9 9 13 9 20 18 9 7 9 10 
13 6 12 11 11 10 13 10 9 8 11 10 9 15 10 10 8 16 7 15 
10 13 12 10 10 16 11 10 9 10 18 14 10 9 9 10 10 9 9 21 
10 12 10 12 10 12 9 13 10 9 9 12 7 10 9 9 10 10 8 14 
17 11 14 1 1 10 13 9 9 8 12 9 24 24 10 9 10 10 9 8 
18 10 18 10 10 10 14 10 10 8 11 24 11 10 8 17 7 9 8 8 
13 10 10 12 9 12 9 10 9 10 10 9 11 9 8 14 17 11 9 9 
10 18 10 10 13 12 11 10 10 9 17 9 9 10 9 9 9 9 10 9 
6 18 8 11 11 10 10 10 9 8 24 10 10 7 9 9 9 9 14 9 
15 20 18 12 10 13 10 14 8 8 10 8 16 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 
15 14 10 8 9 1 10 11 9 9 10 9 10 9 9 9 14 9 8 7 
15 13 10 10 1 10 10 10 16 9 8 14 9 11 9 18 10 8 9 14 
15 14 15 10 10 14 12 10 10 9 13 10 9 10 14 10 9 10 9 9 
13 12 9 10 10 13 14 10 9 9 10 12 9 10 10 9 16 9 9 10 
12 18 10 13 11 11 12 10 14 11 10 11 9 10 9 14 9 7 9 9 
13 17 14 15 15 9 10 10 10 9 8 17 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
